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1I was not in court when Salerno was brought in.  But I did spend a lot of time with him
during trial, and I have seen many surveillance photographs of him taken during the course the
the government’s investigation.  For a fuller disclosure of my connection to United States v.
Salerno: As a summer assistant, I helped with electronic surveillance paperwork.  Then, after a
year of clerking for Chief Judge Wilfred Feinberg and a year clerking for Justice Thurgood
Marshall – who both authored dissents in Salerno during years I was not working for them – I
became an Assistant U.S. Attorney, just in time to play a small part in the Salerno trial, and quite
a large part in the appeals that followed.  I also dealt with Cafaro when he was a cooperating
witness. 
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August 1, 2005 – Draft
The Story of United States v. Salerno: The Constitutionality of Regulatory Detention
Daniel Richman
In the custody of United States Marshals in March 1986 after his arrest on racketeering
charges, Anthony Salerno, known to his associates and a federal grand jury as “Fat Tony,” did
not look particularly dangerous.  Indeed, even before his arrest, when holding court at the Palma
Boy Social Club in East Harlem, the cigar-chomping 74-year-old “Boss” of the Genovese Family
of La Cosa Nostra did not look like the kind of person one crossed the street to avoid on a dark
night.1  But under the recently enacted Bail Reform Act of 1984, federal prosecutors could seek
the pretrial detention of Salerno and his long-time associate Vincent (“Fish”) Cafaro on grounds
of dangerousness.  They did, and the district court so found.  Salerno thereafter spent the rest of
his life in federal custody.
Is it constitutional for the government to lock up people without waiting to convict them
at trial?  If it is, what are the limits on the government’s power to lock up anyone it deems
dangerous?  These are issues raised by preventive detention provisions in bail statutes, and
addressed in United States v. Salerno.  The controversy about these bail statutes, once so hotly
contested, has died down.  But the broader questions about the government’s power to detain
suspected criminals without giving them the benefit of full criminal process remain unresolved,
and have taken on a new urgency as the nation confronts the threat of more terrorist attacks.
Bail Background
The origins of the institution of bail in the United States lie in medieval England.  There,
people accused of crimes were (in numbers and circumstances that varied over time) allowed to
remain at liberty pending trial – which could be far off, depending on the arrival of a traveling
judge.  All it took was the promise of the accused, or that of an acceptable surety, that the
accused would appear for trial.  Over the centuries, the system developed into one that allowed
2See William F. Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 Albany L. Rev. 33
(1977); Daniel J. Freed & Patricia M. Wald, Bail in the United States: 1964, at 1-2 (1964)
(prepared as a working paper for the National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice).
3An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of
the Crown, 1 Wm. & M., Sess 2, ch.2, 10. 
4See John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (49-51 (2003)
(discussing Eighteenth Century English pretrial detention).
5Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959, 969
(1965).
6342 U.S. 524 (1952)
7Id. at 545-46.
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release upon a surety’s pledge of money that would be forfeit should the accused fail to appear.2 
It could be abused however, particularly when the Crown wanted to use bail as a tool of political
oppression.  Indeed, among the grievances against James II listed in the 1689 Bill of Rights was
that “excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal cases to elude the
benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the subjects.”  The remedy established by the new
constitutional order was a guarantee against “excessive bail.”3  Many defendants still languished
in Newgate and other English jails before trial even after 1689,4 but the importance of the right
(at least in principle) was thus recognized.
In the United States, the guarantee in the English Bill of Rights was echoed in the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”  Perhaps the Framers and their English
predecessors could have been somewhat clearer.  This amendment barred courts from imposing
“excessive” bail conditions.  But is there an absolute constitutional right to bail to begin with?  If
there is not, as Professor Caleb Foote pointed out, Congress could render the bail clause “entirely
moot by enacting legislation denying the right to bail in all cases.”5  In a 1952 case, Carlson v.
Landon,6 however, the Supreme Court adhered to a more literal, and limited, interpretation of the
bail clause:
The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the Bill of Rights Act.  In England,
that clause has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to
provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail. 
When this clause was carried over in our Bill of Rights, nothing was said that indicated
any different concept.  The Eighth Amendment has not prohibited Congress from
defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed in this country.”7
8Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 91 (1789).
9John N. Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 Va. L.
Rev. 1223, 1227 (1969).
10See Duker, supra note __, at 82.
11Freed & Wald, supra note __, at 3.
12Id. at 22 (“A study by the United Nations recently disclosed that the United States and
the Philippines are the only countries to allot a significant role to professional bail bondsmen in
their systems of criminal justice.”).
13Forrest Dill, Discretion, Exchange and Social Control: Bail Bondsmen in Criminal
Courts, 9 Law & Soc’y Rev. 639, 670 (1975).
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An important piece of evidence favoring the Supreme Court’s limited reading was that in
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which Congress debated even as it considered the Bill of Rights, the
right to bail was qualified: “[U]pon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except
where the punishment may be death, in which cases it shall not be admitted but by [judges] who
shall exercise their discretion therein, regarding the nature and circumstances of the offense, and
of the evidence, and the usages of law.”8  At the time, “the great majority of criminal offenses
involving a threat of serious physical injury or death to the victim were punishable by death
under state laws” and under federal laws, to the limited extent that federal law address these sorts
of crimes.9  Since most of the original thirteen colonies had similar provisions -- constraining
judicial bail decisions, but leaving the decision about which offenses were bailable to the
legislature10 – the Supreme Court’s reading of the bail clause was quite defensible.    
Against this constitutional backdrop, the federal government and the states had
considerable latitude in how they structured their bail systems.  Their general approach was to sit
back and allow the market to flourish, as commercial bail bondsmen moved in to take the place
of private sureties.  In return for a nonrefundable money premium, these firms guaranteed a
defendant’s appearance at trial; if he fled, they would forfeit their bonds (although they would
sometimes be able to recoup their loss from the defendant or his relatives, if those people had
signed indemnification contracts).11  This system entailed a remarkable outsourcing of criminal
justice authority, without parallel outside the United States.12  But it was comfortable for court
officials, who relied on bail bondsmen to manage the population of arrested persons, and in turn
helped ensure the profitability of selling bail bonds.13
In the 1950s, studies in Chicago, Philadelphia and New York conducted by Professor
Foote and others highlighted the painful inadequacies of this system.  They showed 
the dominating role played by bondsmen in the administration of bail, the lack of any
14Wayne H. Thomas, Bail Reform in America 15 (1976); see John S. Goldkamp et al.,
Personal Liberty and Community Safety: Pretrial Release in the Criminal Court xi 1995).  For an
intriguing proposal, under which defendants would be compensated for pretrial detention, see
William H. Landes, The Bail System: An Economic Approach, 2 J. Legal Stud. 79 (1973).
15See Id. 6-7; 161-64.
16Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 215 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 to 3151
(1989)) (repealed 1984).
17H.R. Rep. No. 1541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 2293, 2296; see John B. Howard, Jr., Note, The Trial of Pretrial Dangerousness:
Preventive Detention After United States v. Salerno, 75 Va. L. Rev. 639, 643 (1989).
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meaningful consideration to the issue of bail by the courts, and the detention of large
numbers of defendants who could and should have been released but were not because
bail, even in modest amounts was beyond their means.  The studies also revealed that bail
was used to “punish” defendants prior to a determination of guilt or to “protect” society
from anticipated future conduct, neither of which is permissible purpose of bail; that
defendant detained prior to trial often spent months in jail only to be acquitted or to
receive a suspended sentence after conviction; and that jails were severely overcrowded
with pretrial detainees housed in conditions far worse than convicted criminals.14
Responding to these studies, and to high-level efforts throughout the country to put bail
reform on the legislative agenda, numerous jurisdictions passed new bail statutes in the 1960s. 
Leading the way was the federal government – in part because of the leadership of Attorney
General Robert Kennedy and Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr.,15 but also because criminal justice reform
in the federal system is far easier than in state systems, which handle so many more defendants,
and in particular defendants accused of violent crimes.  The result was the federal Bail Reform
Act of 196616 which required that every defendant – save those charged with an offense
punishable by death – be released on his own recognizance (a simple promise to return to court
when required) unless the court determined that “such release will not reasonably assurance the
appearance of the person as required.”  The starting point was thus to be simple release.  Bond
was to be imposed only to the extent necessary to assurance the defendant’s return.  The drafters
of the extent explained the limited purpose of this regime:
This legislation does not deal with the problem of the preventative detention of
the accused because of the possibility that his liberty might endanger the public. ...  It
must be remembered that under American criminal jurisprudence pretrial bail may not be
used as a device to protect society from the possible commission of additional crimes by
the accused.17
Such broad pronouncements in the legislative history of the 1966 Act did not mean that
18John N. Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 Va. L.
Rev. 1223, 1223 (1969).  It should be noted that when John Mitchell was later arrested, in 1973,
charged with obstructing an S.E.C. investigation of Robert Vesco, he was released on bail.  See
Photograph, Mitchell Denies Charges, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1973, at A1 (showing former
Attorney General John N. Mitchell leaving federal court after pleading not guilty).
19 Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-
Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 510, 512 n. 3 (1986)
20Howard, supra, 75 Va. L. Rev. at 645; see Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial
Detention and Punishment, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 335, 340 (1990) (noting that “pretrial detention
system in the District of Columbia was the first expressly based upon the threat of criminality
before trial”).
21Barbara Gottlieb, Public Danger as a Factor in Pretrial Release: A Comparative
Analysis of State Laws 19 (National Institute of Justice: July 1985).
22United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022
(1982).
23Gottlieb, supra note __, at 20.
24U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, at HS-23 (2003) (“Crimes
and Crime Rates by Type of Offense: 1960-2002).
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the possibility of considering a defendant’s dangerousness in bail decisions had been removed
from the table.  Immediately upon becoming President, after a campaign in which anti-crime
rhetoric had figured prominently, Richard Nixon proposed amending the Act to permit
“temporary pretrial detention” of criminal defendants whose “pretrial release presents a clear
danger to the community.”18  While this proposal did not make immediate headway, the
administration, with important assistance from William H. Rehnquist, then Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel,19 soon gained passage of
a preventive detention statute for the District of Columbia.20 However, while many predicted that
the new D.C. statute would be used as a model for similar legislation by the states, only twelve
states made moves in this direction during the 1970s.21  One reason states may have held back
was uncertainty about the constitutionality of the D.C. statute.  Once that was (narrowly) upheld
by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in 1981,22 many more states adopted similar
provisions.23
The interest of legislators around the country in preventive detention statutes was not
simply sparked by developments in constitutional law.  There really was a crime problem: In
1960, the murder rate (per 100,000) had been 5.1.  In 1980, it was 10.2.  (It was back down to 5.6
in 2002).  In 1960, the violent crime rate had been 1,887.2; in 1980, it was 5,950.0.  (In 2002, it
was 4,118.8.).24  It was not clear how many crimes were being committed by criminal defendants
25See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note __, at 397-405.
26S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess., 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News, 3182, 3188.
27Id. at 11, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 3194.
28Roy B. Flemming, Punishment Before Trial: An Organizational Perspective of Felony
Bail Processes 155 (1982).
29Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3141-3151
(DATE)).
3018 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
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out on bail,25 but, in this environment, Congress was far more receptive to preventive detention
provisions.  A 1984 Senate report noted that the “broad base of support for giving judges the
authority to weigh risks to community safety in pretrial release decisions is a reflection of the
deep public concern, which the Committee shares, about the growing problem of crimes
committed by persons on release.”26
Yet there was another factor as well, one that had as much to do with restraining
government power as with restraining dangerous defendants.  Even though the 1966 Bail Reform
Act did not authorize consideration of dangerousness, a Senate Report found ample evidence that
judges did so anyway when setting bail, and would regularly impose “excessively stringent
release conditions, and in particular extraordinarily high money bonds, in order to achieve
detention.”  The fault, it was argued, lay less with the judges than with a statute that prevented
the judges from candidly addressing a critical societal concern: “Providing statutory authority to
conduct a hearing focused on the issue of a defendant’s dangerousness and to permit an order of
detention where a defendant poses such a risk to others that no form of conditional release is
sufficient, would allow the courts to address the issue of pretrial criminality honestly and
effectively.”27  As one scholar noted: “[I]f punishment before trial is to be minimized for most
felony defendants, it may be necessary to be more candid about the uses of bail as a means of
preventive detention.  This would elevate the importance of process and how decisions are made
since the rationale for preventive detention would have to be clearly stated before taking such a
step.”28
 Out of these various currents came the Bail Reform Act of 1984, part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.29  Continuing the general presumption of pretrial
release from the 1966 Act, the new law nonetheless provided that if a “judicial officer” (judge or
magistrate) found that “no condition or combination of conditions” would “reasonably assure”
not just the “appearance of the [defendant] as required” but also the “safety of any other person
and the community,” the judicial officer “shall order the detention of the person before trial.”30 
3118 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
3218 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
3318 U.S.C. § 3142(j).
34James Dao, Anthony (Fat Tony) Salerno, 80, A Top Crime Boss, Dies in Prison, N.Y.
Times, July 29, 1992, at D19.
35See Arnold H. Lubasch, Reputed Organized-Crime Figure Charged With Running a $10
Million Yearly Racket, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1977, at 29.
7
This detention order could be entered only after an adversarial hearing, at which, although the
rules of evidence would not apply, the defendant had a right to counsel, and could call and cross-
examine witnesses.  The government bore the burden of showing dangerousness by “clear and
convincing evidence”31 – not “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” (the standard for convicting a
defendant at trial), but more demanding than the “preponderance of evidence” standard that
usually applies in pre-trial factfinding, and indeed applies when the government seeks to show
that a defendant should be detained as a flight risk.  Still, there was a presumption (albeit a
rebuttable one) that a defendant posed a risk of both flight and danger where there was “probable
cause to believe” that the defendant had committed a narcotics offense for which the “maximum
term of imprisonment” was ten years or more, or had used a gun in connection with a crime of
violence, or under certain other circumstances, including where not more than five years had
elapsed since the defendant’s release from imprisonment on state or federal narcotics or violent
crime charges.32  To clear up any misperceptions, the statute noted: “Nothing in this section shall
be construed as modifying or limiting the presumption of innocence.”33 
The new bail statute was immediately the subject of numerous legal challenges in the
lower courts.  The first case to reach the United States Supreme Court involving this or any of the
other state preventive detention statutes was that of Anthony Salerno.
Salerno Case Background
No one would ever have called Anthony Salerno “the Dapper Don.”  An obituary writer
later paid tribute to his subdued sartorial tastes: “Unlike younger Mafia leaders like John Gotti,
Mr. Salerno typified a more old-fashioned gangster ethic that frowned on flamboyance that might
attract attention.  In sharp contrast to Mr. Gotti’s $1,000 designer suits, he was known to hold
counsel dressed in a fedora and T-shirt.”34  From his base in East Harlem, however, Salerno built
Harlem’s biggest numbers racket and solidified his place in the Genovese Family hierarchy.  In
1977, alleging that his numbers operation was taking in at least $10 million annually, federal
authorities brought gambling and tax charges against Salerno.35  After two mistrials on the tax
36See Arnold H. Lubasch, Salerno, 67, Given 6 Months in Prison In Gambling Case, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 20, 1978, at D20.
37James B. Jacobs, Christopher Panarella & Jay Worthington, Busting the Mob: United
States v. Cosa Nostra 95 (1994) (excerpting from indictment).
38John Gotti, Castellano’s successor as head of the Gambino family, was later convicted
for his role in the murder.  United States v. Locasio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993).
39See Tony G. Poveda, “Controversies and Issues,” in Athan G. Theoharis, The FBI: A
Comprehensive Reference Guide, 101, 119-20 (1999).
40See Selwyn Raab, Curbing Mob Chiefs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1985, at B2; Leslie
Maitland Werner, U.S. Officials Cite Key Successes in War Against Organized Crime, N.Y.
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counts, however, he plead the case out and received a six month sentence.36  But the heat would
soon get more intense.
By the time Salerno, then age 74, was arrested on March 21, 1986, on the charges for
which he would be detained, he probably felt rather comfortable in federal court.  In fact, he was
already out on bail on another federal racketeering indictment, also filed in the Southern District
of New York (in Manhattan).
That prior indictment, unsealed on February 26, 1985, charged that Salerno was the boss
of the Genovese Family and a member of the “commission” that “had the power to resolve
disputes and to regulate relations between and among La Cosa Nostra Families.”37  Among other
things, Salerno and his co-defendants (who included Gambino boss Paul Castellano until his
murder on December 16, 1985, outside Spark’s Steakhouse38) were charged with using their
control over the concrete workers union to control the allocation of large concrete construction
jobs in New York, and with resolving a leadership dispute within the Bonanno Family by
authorizing the murder of that family’s boss, Carmine Galante.
The “Commission” indictment was just one component of a broad structural attack on
“traditional” organized crime in New York City  – “traditional” being the way law enforcement
distinguished the five Mafia families and associates from the “emerging” or “non-traditional”
groups of non-Italian origins that would strut the boards by the 1990s.  The statutory tool for this
attack, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act had been on the books
since 1970.  And the FBI had seriously targeted La Cosa Nostra at least since J. Edgar Hoover
acknowledged its existence in the late 1950s.39  In the early 1980s, however, the Justice
Department strategy evolved from piecemeal takedowns into larger scale cases designed to
dismantle whole chunks of families.  This strategy predated the arrival of Rudolph W. Giuliani as
U.S. Attorney the Southern District of New York in 1983, but was given new energy and focus
by Giuiliani’s high-profile methods.40  Salerno was certainly a conspicuous target in these efforts,
Times, Nov. 7, 1983, at A1; see also James B. Jacobs, generally.
41See Arnold H. Lubasch, U.S. Indictment Says 9 Governed New York Mafia, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 27, 1985, at A1.
42United States v. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)[fn No DJ bar to this
successive prosecution – cite CA] 
43Brief for the United States in United States v. Salerno, 88-1464 (2d Cir.), at 10-11.
44Such proffers had previously been found an acceptable way for the government to meet
its burden in detention hearings.  See United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1986).
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having topped Fortune Magazine’s Fall 1986 list of the  “50 Biggest Mafia Bosses.”
After Salerno’s arrest on the “Commission” indictment, he was released on bail, set at $2
million.41 
In March 1986, months before trial began on the “Commission” indictment, Salerno was
arrested again.  This indictment that, like the prior one, charged violations of the RICO Act. 
While the focus of the “Commission” indictment had been horizontal – arrangements between
and among Cosa Nostra families – the focus of the new indictment was vertical.  The enterprise
charged here was “the Genovese Organized Crime Family” and the defendants were all members
or associates of that family.  Salerno was, again, alleged to be the Boss of the Family, and, among
the other defendants, Vincent (“Fish”) Cafaro was alleged to be a “capo” (a lieutenant).  The
racketeering activity charged in this indictment included acts relating to the bid-rigging scheme
charged in the Commission indictment; a scheme to elect and control the president of the
Teamsters International; sundry acts of extortion, and illegal numbers and bookmaking
operations.42 Among the other defendants charged in the indictment were Matthew (“Matty the
Horse”) Ianniello, a longtime “capo” in the Genovese Family; Nicholas Auletta, whose concrete
company became the largest concrete construction company in New York as a result of the illegal
bid rigging scheme, and Edward (“Biff”) Halloran, whose alliance with the mob allowed him to
obtain a virtual monopoly over the supply of concrete in Manhattan.43
At Salerno and Cafaro’s arraignment, the government conceded that neither defendant
posed a risk of flight, but it moved that both be detained on the ground that no bail condition or
combination of bail conditions would assure the safety of the community or any person.  At a
detention hearing, a few days later, the government called no actual witness but “proffered”44
evidence derived from court-ordered electronic surveillance at various locations, including the
Palma Boy Social Club, the club in East Harlem where Salerno seemed to spend most of his
waking hours when he was in New York City (and not at his residence in rustic Rhinebeck,
N.Y.).  These conversations provided graphic proof of the violence with which Cafaro, under
Salerno’s occasional supervision, ran the gambling operation.
45For more on Fratianno’s checkered career as a mobster and government witness, see
Ovid Demaris, The Last Mafioso (1986).  Also see Michael J. Zuckerman, Vengeance Is Mine:
Jimmy the Weasel Fratianno Tells How He Brought the Kiss of Death to the Mafia (1987).
46631 F. Supp. at 1367.
47The admissibility of statements that Lonardo made to a narcotics co-conspirator before
Lonardo’s conviction and eventual cooperation were at issue in another Supreme Court case,
decided less than a month after the Salerno bail decision.  Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.
171 (1987).
48631 F. Supp. at 1368.  
49631 F. Supp. at 1370.
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More powerful, however, was the government’s proffer of the prospective testimony of
two mob turncoats, James (“Jimmy the Weasel”) Fratianno and Angelo Lonardo, the former head
of the Cleveland Family that reported to the Genovese Family in New York.  Fratianno had long
been a star witness in mob prosecutions.45  As he had at a previous trial, Fratianno was prepared
to testify that, back in 1976, he had attended a meeting in the back room of a store at which
Salerno and other Genovese Family members had voted a “hit” on a Family loanshark, John
Spencer Ullo.  The district court later noted that the “‘contract’ was not carried out when Ullo got
wind of the plan in California and was himself able to kill the hitman.”46
The proffer from Lonardo may well have been more significant, in part because it
involved more recent murderous plotting by Salerno and in part because the lateness of
Lonardo’s cooperation – he had not started cooperating with the government until August 1985 –
gave the government a reason to explain why their position on Salerno’s bail had changed since
the “Commission” indictment.47  Lonardo had told of Salerno’s direct involvement in a 1980
“contract” that was carried out, on one John Simone, a/k/a “Johnny Keyes,” and in two other
murder conspiracies.
Salerno’s ability to order “hits” was corroborated by intercepted conversations.  In one,
from January 1985, a Genovese loanshark asked his permission to kill a debtor.  Salerno
responded: “If you want to kill him, we will kill him.”48  An intercept from 1984 also caught
Salerno announcing what he would say if a debtor questioned his status: “Who am I?  I’m the
f_____g boss.”
Salerno proffered more than a dozen witnesses, ready to testify that “they had known
Salerno for many years, considered him a friend, and did not consider him to be any danger to the
community.”  He also proffered a letter from his doctor telling of “a long standing history of high
blood pressure complicated by congestive heart failure.”49
50631 F. Supp. at 1371. 
51631 F. Supp. at 1375.
52Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 525 (1979).
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In an opinion issued April 2, 1986, Judge John M. Walker, Jr., concluded that the
government had “met its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.  The information it
had received of Salerno’s danger to the community, Judge Walker noted, was “overwhelming.” 
“By ‘clear and convincing’ proof, the government has established that Salerno is the head, or
‘Boss,’ of an organization engaged in extortion, loansharking, illegal gambling, and murder. ... 
The government has proffered information showing that Salerno could order a murder merely by
voicing his assent with the single word ‘hit.’”50  Finding “ample information to conclude that
Cafaro and others under Salerno’s control [had] the means to carry out the violent acts,” the court
also noted that “[n]owhere does Salerno claim that his vascular condition will affect his ability to
run the Genovese Family enterprise if he is released.”  
Judge Walker also reviewed the evidence of the violence with which Cafaro managed his
gambling operation and noted: 
The activities of a criminal organization such as the Genovese Family do not
cease with the arrest of its principals and their release on even the most stringent of bail
conditions. The illegal businesses, in place for many years, require constant attention and
protection, or they will fail. Under these circumstances, this court recognizes a strong
incentive on the part of its leadership to continue business as usual. When business as
usual involves threats, beatings, and murder, the present danger such people pose to the
community is self-evident.51
The MCC
Pursuant to Judge Walker’s order, Salerno and Cafaro were detained in the Metropolitan
Correctional Center (“MCC”) in downtown Manhattan, adjacent to the federal courthouse.  
Despite its title, the MCC is a short-term custodial facility, designed to primarily to house pretrial
detainees.  In a 1979 Supreme Court case arising out of complaints that the conditions of
confinement in the MCC were unconstitutional, the Court painted an almost rosy picture of the
facility, built just four years earlier: “The MCC differs markedly from the familiar image of a
jail; there are no barred cells, dank colorless corridors, or clanging steel gates.  It was intended to
include the most advanced and innovative features of modern design of detention facilities.”52
But a jail it was.  The 1979 case noted that MCC inmates were locked into their rooms at
night and during “head counts”; “were not permitted to receive packages from outside the facility
containing items of food or personal property, except for one package of food at Christmas,” and
were subject to unannounced searches of their rooms, and to visual body cavity searches after
53When pretrial detainees are housed too far away from courthouses where they will be
tried, as they all too frequently are, their lawyers are severely handicapped in preparing for trial
or engaging in plea negotations.  See Douglas J. Klein, Note, The Pretrial Detention “Crisis”:
The Causes and the Cure, 52 J. Urban & Contemp. L. 281, 295-96 (1997).
54See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting readiness to reconsider "our substantive due process cases" as inconsistent
with "the original understanding of the Due Process Clause"); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
275-76 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of
Judicial Review 18 (1980) (""Substantive due process' is a contradiction in terms - sort of like
"green pastel redness.'"). 
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every contact visit with a person from outside.  Indeed, pretrial detention facilities are often more
forbidding than the prisons to which defendants are sent if they are convicted.  This is less a
result of legal rules than of the iron laws of real estate: Prisons can be placed in suburban or rural
areas, where there is ample space for outdoor activities.  Jails, at least those used for detaining
defendants facing trial in metropolitan jurisdictions, cannot be too far from the courthouses they
serve.53  That puts them in areas where space is at a premium.  And whatever efforts are being
made to provide recreational and educational opportunities to prisoners are not likely to be
focused on short-termers like those in detention facilities.  
Court of Appeals
After Judge Mary Johnson Lowe, to whom the case was assigned for trial, refused to
reconsider Judge Walker’s detention order, Salerno and Cafaro appealed both judges’ decisions
to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  There, they raised several statutory challenges, including
one claiming that the evidence presented was insufficient to support Judge Walker’s findings. 
They also raised a constitutional claim: that detaining a defendant on the ground that “his release
would pose a danger to the community or any person” violated the due process clause.
A three-judge Second Circuit panel heard the case with appropriate dispatch and rendered
a decision on July 3, 1986.  The court made short work of the defendants’ statutory claims and
found that their detention order did not violate the Bail Reform Act.  But it found the Act
unconstitutional.  While pretrial detention could properly be used to address a risk of flight or a
danger that a defendant would “tamper with or intimidate witnesses or jurors,” it could not be
used as a regulatory measure to protect the community generally against future crimes.  The
Act’s authorization of detention on this ground, Judge Amalia Kearse wrote, was “repugnant to
the concept of substantive due process, which we believe prohibits the total deprivation of liberty
simply as a means of preventing future crimes.”  
The very concept of a “substantive” procedural protection is elusive, and to its critics like
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas and others, mis-begotten.54  The Supreme Court,
however, has long held that the due process clause “contains a substantive component that bars
55Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 331 (1986)).
56198 U.S. 45 (1905) 
57410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
58123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) 
59See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893 (2004).
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certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions "regardless of the fairness of the procedures used
to implement them.”55  The doctrine’s malleability has made it a powerful instrument of judicial
power, to be used for good or ill, with the definition of “good” or “ill” often being in the mind of
the beholder.  Among its more notable applications have been in Lochner v. New York56
(declaring a New York maximum-hours statute for bakers unconstitutional);  Roe v. Wade57
(striking down abortion statute), and Lawrence v. Texas58 (striking down Texas sodomy
statute).59
To distinguish this substantive application of the due process clause from procedural
applications, Judge Kearse drew on a recent opinion by another member of the panel, Judge Jon
O. Newman, in a different detention case.  Judge Newman had explained:
Incarcerating dangerous persons not accused of any crime would exceed due process
limits not simply for lack of procedural protections. Even if a statute provided that a
person could be incarcerated for dangerousness only after a jury was persuaded that his
dangerousness had been established beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial surrounded with
all of the procedural guarantees applicable to determinations of guilt, the statute could not
be upheld, no matter how brief the period of detention. It would be constitutionally
infirm, not for lack of procedural due process, but because the total deprivation of liberty
as a means of preventing future crime exceeds the substantive limitations of the Due
Process Clause. This means of promoting public safety would be beyond the
constitutional pale. The system of criminal justice contemplated by the Due Process
Clause -- indeed, by all of the criminal justice guarantees of the Bill of Rights -- is a
system of announcing in statutes of adequate clarity what conduct is prohibited and then
invoking the penalties of the law against those who have committed crimes. The liberty
protected under that system is premised on the accountability of free men and women for
what they have done, not for what they may do. The Due Process Clause reflects the
constitutional imperative that incarceration to protect society from criminals may be
accomplished only as punishment of those convicted for past crimes and not as
60794 F.2d at 72 (quoting United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1001 (2d Cir.
1986) (emphasis added in Salerno)).
61794 F.2d at 77.  
62794 F.2d at 74.
63794 F.2d at 77-78.
64794 F.2d at 79.
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regulation of those feared likely to commit future crimes.60
Judge Kearse also offered an answer to the hypothetical offered by the third member of
the panel, Chief Judge Wilfred Feinberg, who dissented from her opinion.  Chief Judge Feinberg
had observed: “[I]f a member of a terrorist organization is indicted for blowing up an airliner for
political reasons and there is clear and persuasive evidence that the defendant will do so again if
not confined, it is not self-evident to me that society must nevertheless immediately release him
on bail until he is tried.”61  Judge Kearse answered: 
Even the risk of some serious crime . . . must, under our Constitution, be guarded against
by surveillance of the suspect and prompt trial on any pending charges, and not by
incarceration simply because untested evidence indicates probable cause to believe he has
committed one crime and is a risk to commit another one. Surveillance would doubtless
be the government's response if confidential information, not disclosable to obtain an
indictment, alerted the government to such a risk by a person not charged with a crime. It
should be no less effective in cases where an indictment has been returned, even
assuming, which is unlikely, that a person posing such a risk would not be detained
despite a well-grounded fear that he would flee.62
In his dissent, Chief Judge Feinberg reviewed the due process precedents and highlighted
the procedural protections of the Bail Reform Act.  He concluded that “detaining indicted
defendants under the Bail Reform Act for a limited time on the basis of clear and convincing
evidence that nothing short of confinement will prevent them from violating the law while on
release does not violate any norm of decency implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and does
not violate the Due Process Clause.”63  Having resolved that the Act was not unconstitutional on
its face, Chief Judge Feinberg would also have found that the detention of Salerno and Cafaro for
“a little over three months” had not, under the circumstances, “degenerated into punishment.”64
Later in July, the government sought review of the Second Circuit’s decision in the
Supreme Court.  On November 3, 1986, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case because of
the conflict among the Circuits.  As the Court later noted, “[e]very other Court of Appeals to
have considered the validity of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 has rejected the facial constitutional
65481 U.S. at 741 (citing cases).
66Salerno, 481 U.S. 756 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67481 U.S. at 757.
681988 LEXIS 14032, at 22 n. 27. 
69631 F. Supp. at 1374. 
70Arnold H. Lubasch, Major Mafia Leader Turns Informer, Secretly Recording Meeting of




Meanwhile, the trial of Salerno and his co-defendants on the “Commission” indictment
went forward on September 8, 1986.  It ended on November 19, 1986, with a verdict of guilty on
all counts and on all racketeering acts.  On January 13, 1987 – less than two weeks before the
Supreme Court was to hear arguments regarding Salerno and Cafaro’s detention – District Judge
Richard Owen sentenced Salerno to 100 years’ imprisonment.  Judge Owen, however, took care
not to render the issue of Salerno’s pre-trial detention moot.  The bail statute shifted the burden
of proof for convicted defendants and permitted their release on bail pending appeal only where a
court found “by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a
danger to the safety of any person or the community if release.”   Nonetheless, Judge Owen
ordered that, “[i]nasmuch as defendant Anthony Salerno was not ordered detained in this case,
but is presently being detained pretrial in [the Genovese Family case],” Salerno’s bail status in
the Commission case would “remain the same . . . pending further order of the Court.”66
Although Salerno’s bail status thus did not change while he awaited oral argument on his
detention order before the Supreme Court, Cafaro’s status decidedly did.  On October 9, 1986,
Judge Lowe ordered that he be released “temporarily for medical care and treatment.”67   Bail
was set at a $1 million personal recognizance bond, with the government’s consent.68  Why
government had become so solicitous of Cafaro’s health was not quite clear at the time.  After
all, Salerno’s proffered medical testimony had won him only a direction from Judge Walker to
the Warden of Metropolitan Correctional Center in downtown Manhattan, where Salerno was
being held, “to permit Salerno to receive his regular medication and . . . use an exercise bike
twice a day, every day.”69  It was only later, on March 20, 1987, after the Supreme Court had
heard oral argument on the bail issue, that real reason for Cafaro’s release emerged.  That day,
U.S. Attorney Giuliani announced that Cafaro had been cooperating with the government since
the fall, and had made a controlled purchase of four pounds of high-purity heroin for $420,000
from Ralph (“the General”) Tutino, whom Giuliani described as “a major Mafia drug dealer.”70
In return for Cafaro’s cooperation, the government had agreed to let him plead to a single
71United States v. Cafaro, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14032 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
72See Jerry Capeci, Gangland, Feb. 6, 2003, available at
<http://ganglandnews.com/column316.htm> 
73United States v. Salerno, 837 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1991).
74481 U.S. at 745. 
75Id.; see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 267 n. 18 (1984); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747 (1982). The doctrine in this area is somewhat less than clear.  See Michael C. Dorf, Facial
Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 235 (1994).  But the Court recently
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racketeering count, and to drop the charges then pending against Cafaro’s son, Thomas.71
The risk that the government will use pretrial detention as a means of putting pressure on
defendants to cooperate is a real one, and one highlighted by Justice Marshall in his Supreme
Court dissent.  It would be unfair to assume that this is what happened here, or even that the
allure of immediate release from detention was the main factor in Cafaro’s decision to break his
Cosa Nostra oaths of secrecy and loyalty.  The chance to obtain immunity for his son Thomas
might well have played an important role.  One ought not lightly to make assumptions about
Cafaro’s personal calculus, particularly in matters involving Thomas.  According to one recent
report, even after cooperating Cafaro withheld information from the FBI as part of a deal with a
Genovese leader, in return for protecting Thomas from retaliation.72  
On April 6, 1987, the day trial began for Salerno and his ten co-defendants, the
government moved to sever proceedings against Vincent and Thomas Carfaro.  The trial would
go on for thirteen months, ending May 4, 1988.73
Supreme Court
By the time Salerno’s challenge to his detention reached the Supreme Court, the facts of
the case had lost any legal importance.  His was a facial challenge to the Bail Reform Act, one
that freed his counsel (Cafaro understandably did not send a lawyer), and the Court, from any
obligation to navigate the gritty realities of the New York underworld.  With this freedom from
ugly facts came a heavy legal burden, however – one that required him to “establish that no set of
circumstances exist[ed] under which the Act would be valid.”74  Indeed, as Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted at the beginning of his opinion for the Court, handed down on May 26, 1987:
“The fact the [] Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of
circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid,” since it was only in the limited First
Amendment context – where a defendant could claim that, say, his freedom of speech was being
“chilled” by the mere presence of an expansive statute – that a statute could be challenged as
overbroad.75 In other words, if the Court could imagine any person under any circumstances
noted: “[W]e have recognized the validity of facial attacks alleging overbreadth [] in relatively
few settings, and, generally, on the strength of specific reasons weighty enough to overcome our
well-founded reticence.”  Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. __ (2004).
76481 U.S. at 744 n.2.
77In Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003), Justice Thomas noted:
The Court has held that the Due Process Clause also protects certain "fundamental liberty
interests" from deprivation by the government, regardless of the procedures provided,
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). Only fundamental rights and
liberties which are "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'" and "'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty'" qualify for such protection. [Id.].. Many times, however,
we have expressed our reluctance to expand the doctrine of substantive due process, [] in
large part "because  guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area
are scarce and open-ended," Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
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whom it would not be unconstitutional to detain pretrial on dangerousness grounds, Salerno
would lose.
One nagging factual issue Rehnquist had to deal with was the dissent’s assertion that the
case had been mooted out by the combination of Salerno’s 100-year sentence in the
“Commission” case and Cafaro’s cooperation and release.  Rehnquist disposed of the point in a
footnote: Salerno had been released on bail in the “Commission” case and the detention order at
issue remained the authority for Salerno’s incarceration.  “The case is therefore very much alive
and is properly presented for resolution.”76
Rehnquist then turned to the merits of Salerno’s constitutional challenges, starting with
his substantive due process claim.  The essence of this claim was that Salerno’s pretrial detention
constituted “punishment” and that the only way such punishment could be constitutionally
inflicted was after a full-blown criminal trial.  Implicit in the Court’s treatment of this threshold
issue was its recognition of the enormous doctrinal consequences that follow from labeling
adverse treatment by the state as “punishment.”   For the government to “punish” a criminal
defendant before he ever faced trial -- and had all the benefit of trial rights like the right to a jury,
to the presumption of innocence and to proof beyond a reasonable doubt – would be bad enough. 
To tie that punishment to future crimes he had yet to commit would be quite beyond the pale,
even for those justices who have taken a dim view of substantive due process claims.77
But the mere fact that Salerno had lost his liberty did not mean that he had been
“punished.”  From the Court’s perspective, he simply had been the subject of a regulatory
measure.  In drawing this distinction between punishment and regulation, the Court did not rely
solely on indications in the Bail Reform Act’s legislative history that Congress had the
78 481 U.S. at 747-48 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(2)).
79481 U.S. at 748. 
80Id. (citing Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (upholding the detention and
deportation of a Nazi – albeit one who had fallen out with that party’s leadership in 1933 –
interned under the Alien Enemy Act during World War II)).
81481 U.S.. at 749.
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“regulatory” purpose of preventing danger to the community.  It also looked to whether the
restrictions that the measure imposed were “excessive in relation to” that non-punitive purpose. 
And it found that they were not.  The Act, Rehnquist noted, “carefully limits the circumstances
under which detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes. . . .  The arrestee is entitled
to a prompt detention hearing [], and the maximum length of pretrial detention is limited by the
stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act.”  Moreover, detainees had to be housed “in a
‘facility separate, to the extent practicable, from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being
held in custody pending appeal.’”78
Now Rehnquist had to confront the Second Circuit’s reasoning, which had not turned on
the characterization of pretrial detention on dangerous grounds as “punishment” but had held
such a regulatory deprivation of liberty to be “beyond the constitutional pale.”  But he was not
long detained, for, he asserted, the lower court had misread the constitutional map: “We have
repeatedly held that the Government’s regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate
circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest.”79  “For example,” Rehnquist went on,
“in times of war or insurrection, when society’s interest is at its peak, the Government may detain
individuals whom the Government believes to be dangerous.”80  Rehnquist then noted that
“[e]ven outside the exigencies of war, we have found that sufficiently compelling governmental
interests can justify detention of dangerous person,” and he cited cases involving the “mentally
unstable individuals who present a danger to the public,” “dangerous defendants who become
incompetent to stand trial,” and “juveniles [found to] present a continuing danger to the
community.”  He concluded:
Given the well-established authorities of the government, in special
circumstances, to restrain individuals’ liberty prior to or even without criminal trial and
conviction, we think that the present statute providing for pretrial detention on the basis
of dangerousness must be evaluated in precisely the same manner that we evaluated the
laws in [these other cases].81
The Court then did the usual balancing.  On one side, it looked at the “government’s
interest in preventing crime by arrestees,” which it found “legitimate and compelling.”  This was
no generalized interest in public safety.  What Congress had done was “narrowly focus[] on a
particularly acute problem in which the Government interests are overwhelming.”  The Act
82Id. at 750.
83Id. at 750-51.
84Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
85481 U.S. at 754.
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selects out only those defendants “arrested for a specific category of extremely serious offenses.” 
Not only must the Government have first shown there to be probable cause that a defendant have
committed the charged offense, but then “[i]n a full-blown adversary hearing, the Government
must convince a neutral decisionmaking by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of
release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person.”  The Court concluded:
“Under these narrow circumstances, society’s interest in crime prevention is at its greatest.”82
“On the other side of the scale, of course,” Rehnquist recognized “the individual’s strong
interest in liberty.”  But where “the government’s interest is sufficiently weighty – as it was here,
given the care with which Congress “delineat[ed] the circumstances under which detention
would be permitted” – an individual’s right could be “subordinated to the greater needs of
society.”83
Rehnquist then addressed Salerno’s claim that the Bail Reform Act violated the excessive
bail clause.  Seizing on language from a case about what it meant for bail to “excessive,”84
Salerno had argued that the only risk that could constitutionally be considered in a bail
determination was that of flight.  The Court brushed the language aside as “dicta” and concluded:
“Nothing in the test of the Bail Clause limits permissible Government considerations solely to
questions of flight.  The only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the
Government’s proposed conditions of release or detention not be ‘excessive’ in light of the
perceived evil.”85
Dissents
Justice Marshall’s dissent, in which he was joined by Justice William J. Brennan, opened
in a tone of decided outrage:
This case brings before the Court for the first time a statute in which Congress
declares that a person innocent of any crime may be jailed indefinitely, pending the trial
of allegations which are legally presumed to be untrue, if the Government shows to the
satisfaction of a judge that the accused is likely to commit crimes, unrelated to the
pending charges, at any time in the future. Such statutes, consistent with the usages of
tyranny and the excesses of what bitter experience teaches us to call the police state, have
long been thought incompatible with the fundamental human rights protected by our





90See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming conviction for
conspiracy to bomb twelve U.S. commercial airliners in Southeast Asia in 1995).
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principles of justice  established centuries ago and enshrined beyond the reach of
governmental interference in the Bill of Rights.”86
Marshall followed with jab at the Court for disregarding the facts that Salerno had already
been sentenced to “a century of jail time in another case” and that Cafaro had been released upon
signing up as a cooperator.  “Only by flatly ignoring these matters is the majority able to maintain
the pretense” that a live controversy existed between the parties of the sort required by Article III
of the Constitution.87
Turning to the merits, Marshall chided the majority for the “sterile formalism” of its
division of Salerno’s challenge into due process and excessive bail components.  To be sure,
Marshall found fault with each aspect of Rehnquist’s opinion.  The majority’s “cramped”
substantive due process analysis, Marshall complained, gave far too much license to legislators
interested in using detention to serve the “regulatory” goal of preventing danger to the
community.  And its bail clause analysis failed to recognize that there are limits to the kinds of
interests that Congress can further through the denial of bail.  Because detention on
dangerousness grounds authorized by the Bail Reform Act, “bears no relation to the
Government’s power to try charges supported by a finding of probable cause,” “the interests it
serves are outside the scope of interests which may be considered in weighing the excessiveness
of bail under the Eighth Amendment.”88  What most troubled Marshall, however, is the way in
which pretrial detention for dangerousness undermined the presumption of innocence.  A mere
indictment, he argued, “has been turned into evidence, if not that the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged, then that left to his own devices he soon will be guilty of something else.”89
Justice John Paul Stevens could not join Justice Marshall’s opinion.  Unable to disregard
Chief Justice Feinberg’s airline bomber hypothetical – not very hypothetical in 1987 and
certainly not today90 – he conceded that “it is indeed difficult to accept the proposition that the
Government is without power to detain a person when it is a virtual certainty that he would she
would otherwise kill a group of innocent people in the immediate future.”  In his separate
dissenting opinion, Stevens agreed with Marshall that “the fact of indictment cannot, consistent
with the presumption of innocence and the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause, be used
to create a special class, the members of which are, alone, eligible for detention because of future
91481 U.S. at 768-69.
92Note, Prevention Versus Punishment: Toward a Principled Distinction in the Restraint
of Released Sex Offenders, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1711, 1720 (1996); see Maria Foscarinis, Note,
Toward a Constitutional Definition of Punishment, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1667, 1672 (1980).
93Note, supra note __, Harv L. Rev., at 1720 (quoting Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the
Criminal Sanction 33 (1968)).
94See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).
95The U.S. Attorney’s Office that prosecuted Salerno would regularly prosecute street
narcotics sales as part of its “Federal Day” program.  See Jo Thomas, Odds Heavily Favor
Leniency for Drug Dealing in the City, N.Y.Time, June 30, 1986, at A1.; United States v.
Aguilar, 779 F.2d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that “garden-variety state law drug offenses”
had been converted into federal offenses”).
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dangerousness.”  But, in a move Marshall would hardly have made, Stevens went on to suggest:
“If the evidence of imminent danger is strong enough to warrant emergency detention, it should
support that preventive measure regardless of whether the person has been charged, convicted, or
acquitted of some other offense.”91
Critique of Decision
The main intellectual challenge Rehnquist faced in Salerno was to explain why a decision
upholding the Bail Reform Act as an acceptable regulatory measure would not license
legislatures to freely toss around regulatory justifications whenever they wanted to restrain or
even imprison the subjects of their suspicions.  The Chief Justice’s success in meeting this
challenge was middling at best.  As Rehnquist recognized, reliance on legislative intent for
distinguishing regulation from punishment has its limits.  A court might not be able “to discern
the true intentions of a legislative body.”92  And even if they could be discerned, “making those
intentions dispositive ‘encourages[s] hypocrisy and unconscious self-deception.’”93 Particularly
since the regulation here put its subjects in facilities that looked a lot like the prisons used to
punish convicted criminals, the persuasiveness of Rehnquist’s opinion turned on the extent to
which he could show that the Bail Act had been appropriately tailored to its ostensibly limited
regulatory goal.
Yet Congress actually had painted with a pretty broad brush.  After all, the class of
defendants who dangerousness is presumed include all those facing narcotics charges with more
than a 10-year maximum.  And it is hard to find a federal narcotics charge that does not expose a
defendant to more than ten years.  The street dealer who sells a glassine of heroin, or a single vial
of crack faces a twenty-year maximum.94  These cases are not usually prosecuted in federal court,
but they regularly find their way there.95  To be sure, courts have read the presumption provision
96Federal Judicial Center, The Bail Reform Act of 1984 19-20 (2d ed. 1993) (citing
cases).
97Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174.
98Federal Judicial Center, The Bail Reform Act of 1984 (2d ed., 1993) (discussing United
States v. Infelise, 934 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1991)).
99United States v. Millian, 4 F.3d 1038, 1048 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v.
Orena, 986 F.2d 628, 631 (2d Cir. 1993))
22
merely to impose “the burden of production” on the defendant.  The “burden of persuasion”
remains with the government.  Yet “when a defendant comes forward with no evidence, the
presumption alone supports the conclusion that no conditions of release could reasonably assure
the appearance of the defendant and the safety of the community.”96  Whether or not this creative
shifting of burdens makes sense or not is not the point, which is merely that Congress did not
take great pains in deciding which felony defendants should face preventive detention. 
As for the safeguards offered by the Speedy Trial Act against lengthy pretrial detention,
here, too, Rehnquist may have been a bit too charitable.  The Speedy Trial Act – which requires
that defendants be indicted within 10 days of their arrest if they have been detained, and that trial
begin within 70 days of indictment – does compel courts to move cases along.97  But its clock can
be stopped for numerous reasons, including the making and consideration of defense motions. 
Defendants unwilling to sacrifice these avenues of legal relief for the sake of a speedy trial may
end up spending considerable time in jail.  And while the Court did not preclude a successful
challenge by a defendant subjected to a particularly lengthy period of pretrial detention,
defendants have not met with success in this regard.  In one case, the Seventh Circuit held that
continued detention for two years pending trial did not amount to a due process violation, and
“suggested that, absent a showing of government culpability, no amount of time in detention, by
itself, can constitute a due process violation.”98  In another, the Second Circuit countenanced 30
months of pretrial detention for a narcotics kingpin on both flight and dangerous grounds, and
noted that “‘the constitutional limits on a detention period based on dangerousness to the
community may be looser than the limits on a detention period based solely on risk of flight.  In
the former case, release risks injury to others, while in the later case, releases only the loss of a
conviction.’”99
The Chief Justice may also have been overly charitable when he envisioned a custodial
scheme that kept pretrial detainees separate from convicted prisoners.  That is indeed a goal of
the federal scheme, but the relevant provisions demands that it be achieved only “to the extent
practicable.”  Federal Bureau of Prisons regulations, however, currently note: “What is
practicable is contingent upon the individual institution’s design, structure, and operation.  When
it is not practicable to keep pretrial inmates separate, [] staff may permit, based on sound
correctional judgment, pretrial inmates who do not present a risk to the institution’s security or
100Federal Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Program Statement: Pretrial Inmates,
PS 7331.04 (Jan. 31, 2003).
101Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-
Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J.
Contemp. L. Issues 69, 86 (1996).
102See John Monahan, Prediction of Crime and Recidivism, in 3 Encyclopedia of Crime &
Justice 1125 (2d ed. 2002); John Monahan et al., Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur
Study of Mental Disorder and Violence (2001).
103See also Tribe, supra note __ , at 405 (“If two men appear equally likely to commit a
violent crime, it is arbitrary to imprison the man who is about to be tried for the past offense
while imposing no restraint on the man who is not facing trial.”).
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orderly running to have regular contact with convicted inmates.”100
In short, very little in the majority’s opinion offers doctrinal assurance that the state’s
compelling interest in preventing future crime will not, someday, be allowed to justify the
“indefinite preventive detention of individuals acquitted or not even charged.”101
On the other hand, Marshall had only middling success in addressing why society simply
lacked the power to restrain those who had been shown to pose a danger to its members. Those
accused of crimes must indeed be “presumed innocent,” and at trial, that presumption can be
overcome only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  But not even Marshall would have found
any inconsistency in maintaining this presumption and nonetheless considering the strength of
the evidence against the defendant and his prior record when deciding whether he poses a risk of
flight or a threat to witnesses, should he be released on bail.  And if the possibility that a
defendant has committed the crime can be considered in this regard, why cannot it also be
considered as a factor in deciding whether the accused poses a threat not just to witnesses but to
others?  Predictions of such harm can be difficult,102 yet is the government required to release
someone in its custody whom it is convinced will proceed to inflict such harms?  Marshall’s
categorical answer to the categorical question was “no,” and he had to accept Chief Judge
Feinberg’s imminent airplane bombing as the price of liberty.
Stevens would not accept the bombing, and was thus obliged to distinguish that case from
the one before him.  Yet once he accepted the general proposition of preventive detention, his
critique of the Bail Act ended up being that it is too narrow, rather than too broad.  A nice
counterintuitive debating point,103 but not particularly satisfying for those who believe that the
government does well to legislate in reasonable increments, and can legitimately take a special
interest in the risk that someone it releases from custody might go out to hurt others.
Yet, to be fair to all sides, substantive due process cases often end up being exercises in
104Miller & Guggenheim, supra note __, at 367.
105See Miller & Guggenheim, id. at 370-73; Carol Steiker, Punishment and Procedure:
Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 Geo. L.J. 775 (1997).
106See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as
Criminal Justice, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1429 (2001).
107See Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 Va. L. Rev.
1025, 1025-26 (2002); see also Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Confinement of Dangerous
Offenders, 32 J. L. Med. & Ethics 56 (2004); Stephen J. Morse, An Essay on Preventive
Detention, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 113 (1996).
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contestable, even semi-arbitrary, line-drawing and interest balancing.  Just because a government
measure might feels like punishment to those subjected to it does not necessarily mean that those
people should get all the protections guaranteed to criminal defendants.  To hold otherwise would
be to require the government to produce proof beyond a reasonable doubt before it could, say,
quarantine an infected individual, or detain someone found dangerously mentally ill in a civil
proceeding.  A true legislative intent to further the general good must count for something.  On the
other hand, as Miller and Guggenheim have noted, if “legislative intent is the sole determinant of
punishment, legislatures could circumvent rights expressly protecting the individual from
government authority  . . . by obfuscating the real purpose of punitive regulation.”104  Enormous
constitutional consequences will follow the determination of whether a measure constitutes
“regulation” or “punishment,” yet we lack the doctrinal tools to make such determinations rest on
much more than ipse dixit or complex inquiries on whose conclusions reasonable minds can differ.105
Some have tried a different tack, arguing that the use of dangerousness as a basis for
incarceration should be limited to those situations in which the criminal justice system could not
punish – as would be the case for both quarantines (where there is no justification for punishment)
or the detention of the dangerous mentally ill who lacking criminal culpability cannot be punished.106
This is an utterly defensible position.  Yet it does leave a contestable gap between the civil and
criminal confinement systems when it comes to dangerous agents who are capable of bearing blame
after the danger they pose is realized.107  Is the domain of criminal law so exclusive that the
government must always wait until after a crime (however grievous) has been committed, if the
perpetrator is mentally capable of standing trial?  Giving the government license to lock
blameworthy dangerous people without the niceties of a full-blown criminal trial risks whole-sale
circumvention of the criminal justice system.  But flatly denying the government such power under
all circumstances risks sacrificing innocent bystanders on the alter of legal formalism.
We will shortly explore how these unresolved questions continue to haunt the case law. 
Afterward
108Brief for the United States, US v. Salerno, 88-1464, at 38.
109937 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1991).
110505 U.S. 317 (1992).
111974 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1992).
112United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993) (en banc).
113James Dao, Anthony (Fat Tony) Salerno, 80, A Top Crime Boss, Dies in Prison, N.Y.
Times, July 29, 1992, at D19.
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Will look at three aspects of the legacy of United States v. Salerno:  What happened to
Salerno and Cafaro; what happened to Bail Statute, and what happened to doctrine that the Supreme
Court deployed to affirm it.
What happened to Salerno and Cafaro
In May 1988, the trial of Salerno and his co-defendants (but not Cafaro) concluded with his
conviction on RICO substantive and conspiracy charges and on numerous other counts, including
mail fraud (relating to the bid rigging in the concrete superstructure industry), extortion, and running
an illegal numbers business.  All the other defendants standing trial were also convicted on various
counts.  But Salerno was not convicted on counts or specifications relating to the two murders
alleged in the Government’s bail proffer.  The jury found the “racketeering act” alleging his
involvement in John Simone’s murder had not been proven.  And the Government had consented
to dismissal of the racketeering act charging the conspiracy to murder John Spencer Ullo “after the
sole witness to the crime was unable to identify Salerno in court.”108
In October 1988, Judge Lowe sentenced Salerno to a total of seventy years’ imprisonment,
to run consecutive to the 100-year sentence that Judge Owen previously had imposed on him in the
Commission case.  While the irrelevance of the extra time perhaps reduced Salerno’s interest in
challenging this new conviction, the war was waged on his behalf by co-defendants who had more
at stake.  And a long war it was.  In June 1991, a Second Circuit panel reversed all the convictions,
finding that the trial court had committed reversible error in refusing to allow the defendants to
introduce certain exculpatory grand jury testimony.  The panel concluded that the “spillover taint”
from this error “undermined [its] confidence in the accuracy of all of the guilty verdict.”109  The
Government took the case to the Supreme Court, which overturned the panel’s opinion and sent the
case back down.110  But the panel against reversed the convictions.111  So the Government sought and
obtained en banc review by entire Circuit, which overturned the panel in 1993.112  By this time,
however, Salerno was no longer alive, having died on July 27, 1992, at age 80, in the Springfield,
Missouri, Medical Center for Federal Prisoners.113
114See Joseph P. Fried, Gigante Lawyers Say U.S. Saw Another as Genovese Boss, N.Y.
Times, July 9, 1997, at B3; Patricia Hurtado, FBI Agent Asked: Who is Real Don?; Gigante,
Salerno Both Cited, Newsday, July 9, 1997, at A4.
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Salerno continued to play parts in federal mob trials after his death.  But his role changed.
In 1997, at the federal racketeering and murder trial of Vincent Gigante, the Government’s theory
was that sometime in the early 1980s, long before Salerno’s arrest, Gigante had taken the reins as
the Boss of the Genovese Family.  While Salerno had been out front as the ostensible boss, Gigante,
who wandered around Greenwich Village in his bathrobe, pretending to be crazy, had the real
power.114
Cafaro, for his part, had a bumpy relationship with government following his initial decision
to cooperate.  Shortly before the trial of the mob heroin dealer he had set up for the government,
Cafaro announced that he would no longer cooperate.  When called as a witness at that trial, he
asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege.  But months later, without having made any new agreement
with the prosecutors, he appeared as a witness before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations.115  Eventually, Cafaro and the government reached a new modus vivendi, and he went
on to do a star turn at a number of major organized crime trials.  He has since disappeared into the
Witness Protection Program.116  His son Thomas did a short stint in prison (as a result of Vincent’s
breach of his cooperation agreement), was released, and, in 2003 went back in, having pleaded
guilty, along with co-defendant Vincent Gigante, in another Genovese racketeering case.117
What happened to the bail statute 
The Supreme Court’s decision and the statute it upheld were roundly criticized by many
academics118 and editorial writers.119  But, as Laurie Levenson recently noted: “Attitudes have
changed.  Following Salerno, the public and courts predictably moved into an era in which we are
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(1988).
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relatively comfortable with preventive detention.”120
A government study found that the percentage of federal defendants detained jumped from
26% before the 1984 Bail Reform Act to 31% after.121  In 1996, ten years after Salerno was detained,
of 56,982 defendants arraigned in federal court, 19,254 were ordered detained.  For 42.3% of these
defendants, the basis for the detention order was “risk of flight.”  For 10%, it was danger to the
community, and for 47.0% it was a combination of flight and danger.122  Although the breakdown
in the bases for detention is not available for 2002, that year detention orders were entered for about
40% of all defendants, and the average length of detention for all defendants was 110.9 days.123
By 1988, nineteen states had enacted or were on the verge of enacing statutes allowing for
preventive detention.124  But the regularity with which defendants are detained on dangerousness
grounds in federal court soon became part of the attraction of federal jurisdiction in the violent crime
area, and was touted by federal enforcers as a reason for taking federally cases that would normally
have been prosecuted in state court.125
Does preventative detention really make communities safer?  Intuitive and anecdotal
responses can vary.  The lone criminal’s ability to personally attack people is certainly limited by his
detention.  But crimes can still be planned by detainees who, like Salerno himself, have the ability
to order others to act on their behalf.  In June 1987, during Salerno’s trial and in the very facility
Salerno was being held, another detainee used his visiting and telephone privileges to tamper with
126See United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1988); see also United States v.
LaFontaine, 210 F.3d 125, 127 (2d Cir. 2000) (another witness tampering effort by someone
confined in the MCC).
127Miller & Guggenheim at 384.
128See Thomas Bak, Pretrial Release Behavior of Defendants Whom the U.S. Attorney
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witnesses and obstruct justice.126  On the other hand, the same case provides a nice example of how
detention allows the government to monitor inmate communications and thereby detect and foil
planned crimes.  The bottom line is that detention allows the government to narrow the window of
opportunity for committing further crimes.  But the window remains open.
Precisely how much has been gained from preventive detention provisions?  How many
crimes have jurisdictions using such provisions been able to prevent?  These questions are impossible
to answer, and therein lies a problem.  As Miller & Guggenheim noted: “Conducting a proper blind
test of an operative pretrial detention system is difficult politically because it would involve releasing
some individuals who would otherwise be detained.”127   And in the absence of such tests, or
conclusive results from field studies,128 it is all to easy to assume success: “Once the government has
instituted a system of imprisonment openly calculated to prevent crimes by persons awaiting trial, the
system will appear to be malfunctioning only when it releases persons who prove to be worse risks
than anticipated. . . . [W]hen the system detains persons who could safely have been released, its
errors will be invisible.”129
What happened to legal doctrine
As Rehnquist noted, Salerno was not the first case to uphold detention on the grounds of
dangerousness.  The other cases, however, involved war time or juveniles who were outside regular
criminal justice system.  In explicitly targeting adults who could potentially held criminally
responsible for the crimes the detention was meant to prevent, the 1984 Bail Act marked an important
policy shift, and the decision to uphold it entailed a doctrinal shift of great significance.
Long before the Act was passed, Laurence Tribe explained the basis of his opposition to it:
Throughout history, governments have been tempted to establish order by identifying and
imprisoning in advance all likely troublemakers.  Our society, however, has made the basic
decision not to entrust such sweeping power to the state.  We have relied instead upon the
moral and deterrent effects of laws which define particular acts as crime and which punish all
who violate their proscriptions.  For those believed dangerously ill and hence incapable of
130Tribe, supra note __, at 376; see also See Louis Michael Seidman, Points of
Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of Criminal Law and the Regulatory State, 7 J.
Contemp. L. Issues 97 (1996) (“[E]ven someone unambiguously committed to the regulatory
perspective would want to retain a social practice that effectively communicated blame. 
Inculcating internal moral inhibitions against antisocial conduct is probably the most cost-
effective means of crime control.  The criminal justice system teaches these moral lessons only if
it is perceived as punishing the blameworthy and vindicating the blameless.”).
131See James A. Mercy, et al., Public Health Policy for Preventing Violence, 12 Health
Affairs 7, 7 (1993), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/12/4/7.
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controlling their behavior in response to this system of deterrents, we have devised programs
of civil commitment.  For the rest, we have relied on the threat of sanctions.  Recognizing that
this threat will not deter all those who can control their behavior, we have accepted some risk
of crime as the inevitable price of a system that promises to punish no man until it is shown
beyond a reasonable doubt that he has committed a specifically illegal act.130
Yet acceptance of Tribe’s broad propositions was breaking down, even as he wrote them.  It
is no coincidence that, in October 1985, Surgeon General C. Everett Kopp convened a Workshop on
Violence and Public Health, “which signaled public health’s entry into the field of violence
prevention.”131  To be sure, public health experts were not proposing the use of detention as a public
health tool, and focused instead on measures to change social and physical environments and
individual knowledge, skills or attitudes.  But by de-emphasizing moral accountability,132 they gave
intellectual support a mix of anti-crime measures that relied less on criminal punishment and more
on regulation.
The extent to which criminal procedural had become elaborately constitutionalized played a
role as well.  As Carol Steiker has noted, with the “revolution in criminal procedure” raising “the cost
to government of using the criminal process [,] state and federal legislators and regulators have sought
civil avenues to address what might be more plausibly classified as criminal conduct.”133  And the
result has been the creation of what Steiker has called “the preventive state,” which has deployed a
panoply of “prophylactic measures,” including detention, in the service of its preventive goals.134  The
1984 Bail Act must be seen as part of this broader and continuing trend.  As Steiker reports:
[P]retrial detention of both juveniles and adults has become much more common in recent
135Id. at 777.
136Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of Prevention: The Right of Societal Self-
Defense Against Dangerous Individuals, 16 Hastings Con. L. Q. 329, 330 (1989).
137Id. at 384.
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years.  Many states are seeking to prevent sexual assaults, particularly those against children,
by enacting sex offender registration and/or community notification statutes and by creating
or reviving “sexually violent predator” statutes that permit the indefinite civil commitment
of convicted sex offenders who would otherwise be released at the end of their prison terms.135
In upholding these measures, courts have drawn on the public health model as well, if only
by analogy, creating what Edward Richards has called a “jurisprudence of prevention” that applies
“traditional public health rationales and procedures to individuals who pose a threat to society.”136
“In the prevention cases,” Richards observes, “the Supreme Court has transformed the traditional
police power to restrict disease carriers into a general power to restrict individuals whose criminal
activity poses a threat to society.”137
Since Salerno, what limits are there on when the State can use detention on a regulatory
measure in the service of these preventive goals?  Some answers can be found in Foucha v.
Louisiana,138 decided in 1992, but they are quite tentative.  After Foucha was tried for violent crime
and acquitted by reason of insanity, he was committed to a psychiatric hospital.  Although hospital
officials thereafter decided he was not insane and recommended his release, state law provided that
commitment would continue, even in the absence of mental illness, unless a defendant so acquitted
could prove he was not dangerous to himself or others.  Hospital officials found he had an “anti-
social” personality and refused to certify him as non-dangerous.  So Foucha remained in detention.
The Supreme Court found that Louisiana’s scheme violated Foucha’s right to due process.
Justice Byron White (who had voted with the majority in Salerno) noted: 
 It was emphasized in Salerno that the detention we found constitutionally permissible was
strictly limited in duration. . . . Here, in contrast, the State asserts that because Foucha once
committed a criminal act and now has an antisocial personality that sometimes leads to
aggressive conduct, a disorder for which there is no effective treatment, he may be held
indefinitely. This rationale would permit the State to hold indefinitely any other insanity
acquittee not mentally ill who could be shown to have a personality disorder that may lead to
criminal conduct. The same would be true of any convicted criminal, even though he has
completed his prison term. It would also be only a step away from substituting confinements
for dangerousness for our present system which, with only narrow exceptions and aside from
permissible confinements for mental illness, incarcerates only those who are proved beyond
139504 U.S. at 82-83.
140Schulhofer, supra note __(Contemp Issues) at  89. 
141 504 U.S. at __ ; see Schulhofer at 90.
142521 U.S. 346 (1997).
143521 U.S. at 373-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the Kansas statute does not
violate substantive due process).
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reasonable doubt to have violated a criminal law.139
The implication of this reasoning, according to Stephen Schulhofer, is “to confine Salerno to
regimes of temporary detention pending trial and to indefinite confinement unconstitutional in the
absence of mental illness.”140  Yet the message of Foucha was mixed.  For one thing, it was a 5-4
decision.  For another, there was Justice O’Connor’s separate concurrence.  While she joined the
majority’s opinion, O’Connor suggested that it might indeed “be permissible for Louisiana to confine
the insanity acquittee who has regained sanity if, unlike the situation in this case, the nature and
duration of detention were tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns related to the acquittee’s
continuing dangerousness.  See United States v. Salerno....”141
O’Connor’s concurrence in Foucha presaged her voting with the majority in Kansas v.
Hendricks,142 which involved the first use of Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act.  That act, passed
in 1994,  authorizes the civil commitment of persons who, due to a “mental abnormality” or a
“personality disorder,” are likely to engage in “predatory acts of sexual violence.”  The state moved
to commit Hendricks, who had a long history of sexually molesting children and who was due to be
released from prison after serving time for a serious of convictions for sexual assault of minors.  After
a hearing at which Hendricks testified that he could not control his sexual desires for children when
he got “stressed out,” the jury determined that he was a sexually violent predator, and he was
committed.
Upholding Hendrick’s commitment, the Supreme Court concluded that civil detention of sex
offenders, based on a finding of “mental abnormality,” was neither “punishment” as a constitutional
matter, nor, as a regulatory measure, did it amount to a substantive due process violation.  Writing
for the Court, and without substantial disagreement from the dissenting justices on this point,143
Justice Thomas noted:
Although freedom from physical restraint "has always been at the core of the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action," . . . .  that liberty interest is
not absolute. The Court has recognized that an individual's constitutionally protected interest
in avoiding physical restraint may be overridden even in the civil context . . . .Accordingly,
States have in certain narrow circumstances provided for the forcible civil detainment of
144521 U.S. at 356-57.
145Steiker, Limits, supra note __, at 786.
146Id. at 788.
147534 U.S. 407 (2002).
148Id. at 411.
149533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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people who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public
health and safety. . . . We have consistently upheld such involuntary commitment statutes
provided the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary
standards.. . .  It thus cannot be said that the involuntary civil confinement of a limited
subclass of dangerous persons is contrary to our understanding of ordered liberty.144
Notwithstanding the lack of controversy, the Court had indeed expanded the universe of
“dangerous” individuals whom a state could choose to lock up.  Previous cases had involved “mental
illness,” which “however defined, carries with it the legal connotation [] of the kind of mental state
sufficient to impair cognition or volition so seriously as to render the individual legally irresponsible
and thus not properly subject to criminal punishment.”145  “Mental abnormality” or “personality
disorder” are far broader terms, and the Court’s opinion left open “the degree of cognitive or
volitional impairment” constitutionally necessary for indefinite confinement on dangerousness
grounds to occur.146  In 2002, in Kansas v. Crane,147 the Court returned to the Kansas statute, and
Justice Breyer, writing for a healthy majority, addressed the issue (still without wholly clarifying it).
Although the Constitution does not require that the state show “total or complete lack of control,”
before it could confine someone, the Court did say it required that there be some sort of finding as
to his lack of control.148
Incremental shifts can also be found in the Court’s post-Salerno cases involving deportable
aliens.  Zadvydas v. Davis,149 decided in 2001, involved a statutory provision allowing the detention
of aliens whose deportation had been ordered but could not be removed, there being no country to
receive them.  The Court, by a 5-4 vote, interpreted the statute not to authorize indefinite confinement.
Yet before reading the provision to avoid a “constitutional problem,”150 Justice Breyer, writing for
the majority, explained what this problem would be.  Under the Court’s cases, he noted, government
detention violates substantive due process
unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding, see United States v. Salerno, [] or in
certain special and “narrow,” non-punitive “circumstances,” [citing Foucha], where a special
justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the “individual’s
151533 U.S. at __.
152Id. at __.
153538 U.S. 510 (2003).
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constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.”  Kansas v. Hendricks [].151
And he found “no sufficiently strong special justification here for indefinite civil detention, at least
as administered under this statute.”152
Addressing a quite separate immigration detention provision in 2003, Demore v. Kim,153 was
not necessarily inconsistent with Zadvydas, but its tone and deference to legislative judgment was
markedly different.  The provision here legislatively required detention during removal proceedings
for limited class of deportable aliens, including those who had previously been convicted of an
aggravated felony.  Focusing on the limited nature of the detention (compared to that in Zadvydas),
the Court held that “Congress, justifiably concerned that deportable criminal aliens who are not
detained continue to engage in crime and fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers,
may require that persons such as [Kim] be detained for the brief period necessary for their removal
proceedings.”154  In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens and Ginsburg, made an
important point, however: “Due process calls for an individual determination before someone is
locked away.  In none of the cases cited did we ever suggest that the government could avoid the Due
Process Clause by doing what § 1226(c) does, by selecting a class of people for confinement on a
categorical basis and denying members of that class any chance to dispute the necessity of putting
them away....”155
Post 9/11
Carol Steiker observed in 1998 that “[t]he preventive state is all the rage these days,”156 and
could provide considerable evidence to support for point.  By 2003,  fifteen states had joined Kansas
in passing laws allowing the civil commitment of sexually violent predators.157  But, for all the
controversy over the legislation reviewed in these post-Salerno cases, and the decisions  that generally
upheld these measures, the categories of people subject to preventive detention in the United States
158
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were pretty limited.  Defendants facing charges for past crimes.  Individuals said to be suffering from
some mental abnormality.  Deportable aliens.  The legal reasoning upholding these measures did not
so clearly cabin the State’s power.  But whether because of policy, fiscal restraint, or self-conscious
constitutional interpretation, legislators did not slide too far down the slippery slope.158
Then came the coordinated al Queda terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the
expectation of further terrorist attacks, with the fear that they would involve weapons of mass
destruction.
Faced with the catastrophic consequences of such attacks, and unwilling to rely on the
deterrent effects of ex post prosecutions, the Department of Justice immediately used -- and, in the
eyes of many critics, abused -- available tools for detaining people it thought might be involved in
further terrorist activity.  Between September and December 2001, it detained more that 600 aliens
on immigration charges, and a total of 762 between September 2001 and August 2002.159  It  detained
other people on material witness warrants, obtained in connection with grand jury proceedings.160
And it brought criminal charges for offenses that ostensibly had no terrorism connection, as a means
of gaining custody over terrorism suspects.161
162CNN, Ashcroft Statement on “Dirty Bomb” Suspect, June 10, 2002.
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Yet questions arose, first in theory: What if the government was presented with a situation in
which it believed a that person posed a grave terrorist threat and, for some reason, it could not detain
the person on immigration charges or as a material witness?  Would its avenues for action be
restricted to those allowed by the criminal process: arrest on probable cause and then indictment?
What if it lacked sufficient evidence to bring such charges but had enough to make action imperative?
We thus came back to the problem posed by Chief Judge Feinberg in his Salerno dissent.  But now
presented in the wake of attacks that killed 3000 people in one day.
Then, on June 10, 2002, the hypothetical became a reality when Attorney General John
Ashcroft announced that  Abdullah Al Muhajir, an American citizen born “Jose Padilla,” who had
already been arrested and detained pursuant to a material witness warrant, had been transferred to the
custody of the Defense Department for indefinite detention.  Padilla, Ashcroft explained, was “a
known terrorist who was exploring a plan to build and explode a radiological dispersion device, or
‘dirty bomb,’ in the United States.  And “[t]he safety of all Americans and the national security
interests of the United States” required that he be detained as “an enemy combatant.”162  He offered
few details then or later.
Padilla was incarcerated in a Navy brig in South Carolina and was prevented from meeting
with his lawyer until 2004.  But she nonetheless challenged his detention in a case that wound its way
up to the Supreme Court.163  Shortly before the Court decided the case (but long after it was argued),
the Justice Department offered a few more details about Padilla.  Padilla, the department revealed,
had received explosives training at an al Qaeda camp, and had proposed a plan to al Qaeda leaders
involving an improvised nuclear bomb.  The leaders never thought anything would come of that idea,
but instead suggested that Padilla blow up high-rise apartment buildings in the U.S.   Deputy Attorney
General James Comey explained:
Had we tried to make a case against Jose Padilla though our criminal justice system,
something that  [the U.S. Attorney’s office] could not do at that time without jeopardizing
intelligence sources, he would very like have followed his lawyer’s advice and said nothing,
which would have been his constitutional right.  
He would likely have ended up a free man, with our only hope being to try to follow him 24
hours a day, seven days a week, and hope – pray, really – that we didn’t lose him.164
The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of Padilla’s case, holding only that the challenge
165Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
166124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
167See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (holding that United States courts have
jurisdiction to consider challenges to legality of detentions of foreign nationals captured abroad
in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay).
168115 Stat. 224.
169124 S Ct. 2640.
170124 S. Ct. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
171Id. at 1660 (Souter, J., concurring).
36
to his detention should have been filed in another district.165  But, in another case decided the same
day, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,166 the Court faced a somewhat different case – an American citizen captured
in Afghanistan and detained in the United States as an enemy combatant.  (Had he not been a citizen,
he likely would have been sent to the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Naval Base, where the military has
been detaining foreign nationals captured abroad during hostilities.167).  A majority of the Court
upheld the government’s power to detain such combatents, at least for the duration of the hostilities
in Afghanistan.  Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and
Breyer, concluded that the Executive had been authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military
Force168 passed by Congress in the immediate wake of September 11 to detain enemy combatants,
regardless of their citizenship.169  Writing separately, Justice Thomas agreed, and went on to suggest
that “the President very well may have inherent authority to detain those arrayed against our
troops.”170  Justice O’Connor’s plurality, joined in a separate opinion by Justices Souter and
Ginsburg,171 concluded that Hamdi had a due process right to contest the basis for his detention before
a neutral decisionmaker, but the government’s broad authority to detain enemy combatants during
wartime was, for a majority of the court, settled.
To what extent did the broad executive authority upheld in Hamdi extend to Padilla, who had
been detained not in Afghanistan during open hostilities, but at O’Hare International Airport, in
Chicago?  For the district judge hearing Padilla’s habeas corpus challenge to his detention – once
Padilla re-filed his petition in the right district – the two cases had little in common.  Congress had
authorized the President to use all “necessary and appropriate force.”  But Padilla’s 
alleged terrorist plans were thwarted at the time of his arrest.  There were no impediments
whatsoever to the Government bringing charges agains him for any one or all of the array of
heinous crimes that he has been effectively accused of committing.  Also at the Government’s
disposal was the material witness warrant. [S]ince [Padilla’s] alleged terrorist plans were
thwarted when he was arrested on the material witness warrant, the Court finds that the
President’s subsequent decision to detain [Padilla] as an enemy combatant was neither
172Padilla v. Hanft, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2921 (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2005).
173Id.
174See Glenn Frankel, Four Britons Tied to London Blasts, Wash. Post, July 12, 2005, at
A1.




The district court went on to note: “Simply stated, this is a law enforcement matter, not a military
matter.”173
There is a neatness to District Judge’s Henry F. Floyd’s approach to Padilla’s detention: For
American citizens in the U.S., at least, the normal rules apply.  They give the government ample
authority to detain charged defendants and material grand jury witnesses, and no further authority is
available or needed.  Yet the neatness is illusory.  Regardless of the credence one gives to the
government’s claims about Padilla, it hardly (and sadly) does not strain reality to think that there will
be people in the United States, even citizens,174whom the government suspects of planning
catastrophic terrorist attacks, but against whom the government lacks the ability to bring criminal
charges, even ones ostensibly unrelated to terrorism.  Material witness warrants can often provide a
basis to detain a witness pending his appearance before a grand jury or at trial, but it far from clear
that their use purely as detention devices should be condoned.  And even if detention were possible,
other questions would remain: Is the government bound to get the testimony immediately?  If it is,
it is bound to let the witness go thereafter, even though he still poses threat?  
So what about Judge Feinberg’s terrorist bomber?  Is it so clear that our only recourse for
stopping him is the criminal justice system?  In that system, we take risks that we generally accept,
even embrace.  Perfectly effective 24-hour surveillance occurs only on television program.  Yet if the
bad guy whom we do not quite have the goods on commits a crime, however heinous, while we are
trying to gather admissible proof of his intentions, we sigh and say “That is the price we pay for a free
society.”  With the new scale of the threat,  the risk calculus may be changing.  During oral argument
in the Fourth Circuit after the government appealed Judge Floyd’s decision, the Solicitor General
asserted that, like Afghanistan, the United States was now “a battlefield.”175  Anyone who walked
around Lower Manhattan in the weeks after September 11, 2001, or the Madrid train station after
March 11, 2004, or the London Underground after July 7, 2005, might well agree.  Moreover, even
a skeptic or critic on this score might fairly recognize that at some point, the classification would be
apt and might ask whether courts are competent to do the line-drawing.
It is far too early to predict how the law will develop in this area.  Yet is not too early to see
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how, by cutting imprisonment loose from its criminal law moorings, United States v. Salerno has
played a pivotal role in turning what many thought to be a bedrock constitutional right into a matter
of legislative or even executive policy.  Even one who embraces the recognition of the state’s
fundamental power to protect its citizens from harm can be unsettled by this new world of few
certainties.
